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1. INTRODUCTION
Ž .Ž .The definitions of subgame perfect equilibrium SPE Selten, 1965 ,
Ž .Ž  .coalition-proof Nash equilibrium CoalitionPNE Bernhein et al., 1987 ,
Ž .Ž  .and communication-proof equilibrium Com-PE Ferreira, 1996 certainly
reduce the number of equilibria in a given game with respect to the basic
Ž .Ž .definition of Nash equilibrium NE Nash, 1951 ; but they should not be
regarded as refinements of NE. It is beter to think of them as extensions
of NE for diferent kinds of environments. In this way, SPE is an extension
to games in extensive form, whereas CoalitionPNE and Com-PE are
extensions for games with communication and no commitment for one
stage and multistage games, respectively.
Ž .Here we present extensions not refinements of the CoalitionPNEa and
Com-PEa that have been motivated by the two folowing discussions.
First, in noncooperative games, it has always been assumed that either
Ž .no communication exists NE and SPE , or that players can freely commu-
Ž .nicate but cannot sign agreements CoalitionPNE and Com-PE  However,
there are many intermediate possibilities between universal communica-
tion and no communication. This paper uses ideas from the literature of
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cooperative games to interpret intermediatecommunication as free com-
munication between players, but only within certain permited coalitions.
This is the first step toward a model of coalition formation. In cooperative
games, where communication and the possibility of commitments are tacit
assumptions, the formation of coalitions underlies several definitions like
Žvon-Neumann and Morgenstern’s stable set von-Neumann and Morgen-
.stern, 1953  In applications of cooperative game theory, the topic is
Ž .recurrent see, for example, Shubik, 1982, and Mueler, 1989  However,
nothing like this has appeared in the coalition and renegotiation proof
literature.
Coalition-PNE is not the only definition that has been proposed to
capture the possibility of coalitional deviations in normal form games, but
it is, however, the first to incorporate some consistency criteria in the
behavior of the intermediate and the grand coalitions. It is also the best
known of al of the definitions, and it shares with the others the problem of
nonexistence in many games. These are the main reasons to use this
particular definition in the present paper, and the general analysis would
not change if any other concept were to be used. For extensive form
games, there are a couple of definitions that involve coalitional deviations,
but only Com-PE includes renegotiation issues. Again, in the future other
concepts might compete with Com-PE or would develop it further, but so
far it is the only available definition, and, as in the normal form case, the
main ideas of this paper do not depend on the particular definition.
Second, most definitions of equilibrium for games in extensive form
require that the same kind of equilibrium be induced in every subgame,
even in those that are not supposed to be played. This is a natural
requirement if one wants to explain why the equilibrium path wil be
folowed by al players. In the context of no communication, this require-
ment presents no problem, since existence has been proved for NE and
most of its refinements under general conditions. For coalitional equilibria
whose existence is not guaranteed, the requirement may be too demand-
ing. The equilibrium may not exist in a continuation of the game that
clearly wil not be folowed, but this situation should not be the cause for
the nonexistence of the equilibrium in the whole game.
In this paper we use the model of endogenous formation of coalitions in
Ž .Ž .Aumann and Myerson 1988 A & M to extend the definitions of Coali-
tionPNE and Com-PE to situations of partial communication, and provide
existence of these extensions.
The general idea can be introduced with the folowing example. Suppose
Ž .
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that three players play a game where 10, 10, 0 are their respective payofs
in a self-enforcing coalitional equilibrium, when only players 1 and 2 can
communicate with each other beforeeveryone chooses his or her strategy.
Ž .Suppose further that 8, 8, 8 are the payofs of an equilibrium when the
Ž .players of any two pairs of players but not the other pair can communi-
cate with each other, and that no self-enforcing equilibrium exists when
any coalition is possible. Finaly, consider the situation in which players 1
and 2 meet first. One can argue that as long as the three players do not
Žexpect too much from a coalitional structure with no equilibrium say no
Ž .more than 7, 7, 7 , neither player 1 nor player 2 wil open negotiations
with player 3. This is not only because they wil get 8 rather that 10 in that
situation, but also because they know that once two pairs can communi-
Žcate, the third pair wil not open negotiations each player would get 7
.instead of 8  One may conclude that a structure with only two players
being able to communicate and refusing further communications is a
natural framework of negotiations for the game.
ŽFolowing A & M, we wil use the notion of a cooperation structure also
. Ž .cooperation graph , introduced in Myerson 1977 , to model the frame-
work of negotiations for the game. This graph is defined as one whose
vertices are the players. An edge of the graph is to be interpreted as a link
between two players that, when it exists, can be used to carry on meaning-
ful direct negotiations.
Modeling the endogenous formation of coalitions is equivalent to model-
ing the endogenous formation of links that form the cooperation structure.
This can be done with a noncooperative game previous to the actual game,
Ž .
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in which players decide with whom if anyone to open a link. Players must
take into account that the decision of opening a link may lead other
players to open new ones that were not previously profitable for them. Any
equilibrium of this game provides a cooperation graph for the actual game.
To anticipate the opening of new links and to decide whether that is good
or bad, each player must know what to expect from every possible
cooperation graph.
The diferences between the model in A & M and the one presented in
this paper start when a player compares his situation in two diferent
graphs. In coalitional games, once a unique value is defined, the player has
to compare just two numbers. In normal form games, we have no theory
that predicts a unique coalitional self-enforcing equilibrium; moreover, the
equilibrium may not exist.
The approach suggested in this paper is based on an extension to
cooperation graphs of the definitions of CoalitionPNE and Com-PE, and
on a definition of continuation values for the cases in which no equilibrium
exists. These continuation values alow us to solve the auxiliary game in
the same way as was discussed above, namely, by not insisting on having an
equilibrium behavior in every subgame.The role of these continuation
values wil be endogenously justified as a kind of fulfiled expectations.
The general conclusion of the paper is that for reasonable continuation
values, the auxiliary game has a subgame perfect equilibrium that specifies
Ž .a coalitional structure in which the CoalitionPNE Com-PE exists.
The model wil be presented first for normal form games and then wil
be generalized to extensive form games. The generalization is straightfor-
ward, but is presented in a separate section because the extension to
multistage games may not be the only natural one, and because the
simplicity of the normal form makes the analysis simpler.
In recent years there has been a growing literature on coalition forma-
tion. A brief summary includes the study of noncooperative implementa-
Žtion of cooperative solutions e.g., Perez-Castrilo, 1994; Perry and Reny,´
.1994 , alternative approaches to the model by Aumann and Myerson of
Žcoalition formation in cooperative games e.g., Duta, Nouweland and Tijs,
.1996; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; and Ray and Vohra, 1996 , and the
introduction of hybrid models in which cooperative and noncooperative
Ž .behaviors are alowed e.g., Zhao, 1992  As far as we know, ours is the
only totaly non-cooperative study of coalition formation in which both the
original and the auxiliary games are solved assuming a noncooperative
behavior.
The paper is structured as folows. Section 2 presents the definitions, the
model of coalition formation, and the results. In Section 3 some examples
are analyzed. Section 4 contains a detailed discussion. Section 5 extends
the analysis to multiperiod games, and Section 6 concludes.
2. A MODEL OF COMMUNICATION
Let gbe a graph defined onN, the finite set of players. Given this
Ž. Ncooperation graphg, letCg C 2 for aliandjinC, there exists
4 Ž.a path ingrestricted toCthat goes fromitoj; the elements inCg wil
be interpreted as the coalitions that can be formed according tog. Now we
can extend the CoalitionPNE to a cooperation graphg:
Ž. Ž 4 . ŽDEFINITION1. i In a single player game N 1,S,u,a in1 1.general mixed strategys* S is a Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium1 Ž. Ž.restricted to a graphg, CoalitionPNEg, if and only ifs* maximizesus1
Ž. Ž .i Letn 1, and assume that CoalitionPNEghas been defined
for games with fewer thannplayers. Then
Ž. Ž .a For any game N,S,u with nplayers,s* Sis self-
Ž.enforcing restricted togif, for alC Cg,C N,s is a Coali-CŽ. Ž .tionPNEgin the game s where the strategies ins are fixed C
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Ž. Ž .b WhenN Cg, for any game withnplayers,s Sis a
Ž.CoalitionPNEgif it is self-enforcing restricted togand if there does not
exist anothers Sthat is self-enforcing restricted togand such that
Ž. Ž .us us* for aliinN.i i
Ž.The definition of CoalitionPNEg agrees with that of CoalitionPNE
whengcontains al possible edges. Then the Coalition-Proof Nash equilib-
Ž .rium may be interpreted as a self-enforcing equilibrium if it exists when
there is ful and free communication between players. Similarly, whengis
Ž.the graph with no links, a CoalitionPNEgis a Nash equilibrium in .
Ž. Ž. Ž.4DEFINITION2. For the game ,eg eg,...,e g is an aspira-1 ntion profile in the cooperation graphgif
Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž.4 Ž . Ž .4i eg eg,...,e g us* ,...,us* for some Coali-1 n 1 nŽ.tionPNEgs*, if it exists.
Ž. 4 Ž. Ž . Ž.i For everyi 1,...,n, minus eg max us if nos i i s iŽ.CoalitionPNEgexists.
In words, an aspiration for a player is his or her payof in an equilibrium
Ž .whenever it exists al players expect the same equilibrium , and anything
between the maximum and the minimum she or he can get in a situation of
no equilibrium. In the later case, players may have inconsistent beliefs. In
Section 4 there is a discussion regarding the meaning of these aspirations.
Ž.The componenteg wil be caled anaspirationfor playeriin thei Ž.4graphgin the game ; ande eg , whereGis the set of possibleg Ggraphs onN, wil be caled aset of aspirationsin the game.
Given a normal form game with nplayers, construct an auxiliary
Ž .linking game as folows. Consider the set of pairs of playersNN 1 2
Ž .and an ordering on this set this ordering wil be caled therule of order.
Starting with the first player in the first pair, players decide whether to
accept the opening of a link with the other player in the pair. To form a
link, both potential partners must agree. Once formed, a link cannot be
destroyed. The only other requirement is that after a link has been formed,
Ž .each of thenn 1 2 pairs must be given an opportunity to form an
additional link, starting with the pair next in line according to the rule of
order. The game assumes perfect information. The game ends when, after
opening a link, al of the pairs decide not to open a new one, when al links
are formed or when no link is formed after the first round. This gives a
standard finite extensive form game of perfect information, the result of
which is a cooperation graphg. The payof to each playerican be any
Ž.aspirationegi
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Note that because the auxiliary linking game assumes perfect informa-
tion, it has subgame perfect equilibria SPE in pure strategies for any set of
aspirationse. Each one of thoseequilibria is associated with a unique
Ž.cooperation graphg, and therefore with a profile of aspirations ing,eg
To state the results, we need the folowing definition:
DEFINITION3. Letg* be the unique cooperation graph associated with
a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the auxiliary linking
Ž .game of when the aspirations aree*. Ife*g* are the payofs of a
Ž .CoalitionPNEg* , theng* is caled anatural structureof . The triple
Ž . Ž .g*,s*,e* , whereg* is a natural structure,s* is a CoalitionPNEg* with
Ž .payofse*g* , ande* is a set of aspirations, wil be caled anequilibrium
Ž .in a natural structureENS for .
ŽFor some given aspirations, a natural structure may not exist when al
subgame perfect equilibria of the auxiliary linking game lead to a coopera-
Ž. .tive graphgin which no CoalitionPNEgexists  Then the question is,
what conditions on the set of aspirationselead to natural structures in the
auxiliary game? Proposition 1 provides an answer to this question. First
Y Ž. 4define the setsG g G CoalitionPNEgexists andG g GNŽ. 4CoalitionPNEgdoes not exist . Aspirations in a graphg G wil beNcaledcontinuationalues.
PROPOSITION1. Gien the game ,there exists a profile of continuation
Ž.4alues e*g,g G ,such that for any aspiration profile e satisfyingNŽ. Ž.eg e*g,there always exists a natural structure for .Furthermore,these
continuationalues do not need to be lower than the payofs of some natural
structure existing in for some other aspirations.
Proof. First we establish the folowing fact. Given a game , there
exists an aspiration profilee*, such that the auxiliary linking game has at
least one subgame perfect equilibrium whose associated cooperation graph
g* is a natural structure of .
This fact is proved by constructing one such profile of aspirations. For
that, define an aspiration profileewith the condition that, for every
Ž. Ž.4cooperation graphg G ,eg min us . Therefore, if we applyN s i i Nbackward induction to find a SPE of the auxiliary game, at no point wil a
player find it profitable to choose an action that leads to a graphg G .NIn any SPE where players do not choose those actions, the resulting graph
must belong to G . The nonemptyness ofG is guaranteed by theY Yexistence of NEa.
Fact 2 is as folows. Letebe a profile of aspirations that lead to a
Ž. Ž . Ž .natural structureg*. Then any aspirationsesatisfying ieg egif
Ž. Ž . Ž .g G , and ieg eg* , otherwise, lead tog*. To see this, considerYthe original auxiliary game with aspirationse, and the actions that consti-
tute the SPE that leads tog*. Consider these same actions when the
aspirations aree
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. If they do not form a SPE, an individual finds it
profitable to deviate at somepoint. If this deviation induces a graph inG ,Ythen the same deviation would have upset the SPE in the original auxiliary
game. If it induces a graph inG , the deviation is not profitable as, byNdefinition, the player cannot improve his or her payof with respect tog*.
The two contradictions complete the proof of fact 2.
Now notice that we can proceed as folows. Given a normal form game,
define a first set of continuation values arbitrarily low for coalition struc-
tures in which no equilibrium exists, and find a first natural structure using
Ž .the auxiliary linking game by fact 1  Replace the first continuation values
with the payofs in this natural structure. Find a new natural structure with
Ž .these new continuation values by fact 2  We can continue in this way and
get the existence of a natural structure with weaker conditions on the
continuation values as long as we get increasing payofs. This means that
the continuation values do not need to be lower than the payofs of some
natural structure. Thus we have proved the proposition. Q.E.D.
A corolary of Proposition 1 is that for some aspirations not to lead to a
natural structure, there has to be at least one player who expects more in
someg G than in some of the natural structures of .N Ž.Since any CoalitionPNEg is a NE of the game, to get a natural
Žstructure it is enough that the continuation values expectations in a
.nonequilibrium situation are lower than the payofs of a NE. This does
not seem too demanding; however, there is no theory for expectations in
nonequilibrium situations. To be on the safe side, one would like to be
able to increase the upper bound for the continuation values in case the
Ž .players have too optimistic although incompatible expectations in the
case of nonequilibrium. The next proposition shows a way in which this
can be done.
PROPOSITION 2. Let g be a natural structure gien by a SPE in the
auxiliary linking game in which player i refuses to open a link with player j.Let
Ž .gbe the graph resulting from adding the link i,j to the graph g.Then if
Ž . Ž. Ž . Ž . Ž.g G ,the profiles e g eg,eg unbounded and e g e gN i i j k kŽ .k i,j are continuationalues that produce the same natural structure g.
Proof. Ifiplays beforej, it is a best action forjto choose to open a
Ž .link with playerifor large enougheg  Given this, the only way toj Ž .prevent playerifrom choosing to open a link with playerjis ifegiŽ.eg  Q.E.D.i
There is stil another way to relax the requirement for the continuation
values. If we have that for a cooperation graphgthere exists a Coali-
Ž.tionPNEgand that the same is true for any graph included ing, then we
Ž.could use the payofs in CoalitionPNEg
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as the upper bound of the
continuation values to find a first natural structure. It would then be
important to know whether theexistence of the solution concept that we
apply to cooperation graphs has some monotonicity property of this kind
with respect to graphs. Proposition 3 shows that, for at most three players,
this property is indeed satisfied by CoalitionPNE.
PROPOSITION3. Let N 3,and let g be a graph for which there exists a
Ž. Ž .ŽCoalitionPNE g,then if g* g,there exists a CoalitionPNE g* Proposi-
tion3cannot be generalized for N 3,as the folowing game shows:
Ž . 4 4. Ž .Ž 4.A,B,C,D,S ,u ,with S i,i i A,B,C,D and withii ii i 1 2Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .u A,B,C,D 2, 2, 2, 2 , u A,B,C,D 4, 4, 0, 0 ,1 1 1  1 1 1 2  1Ž  . Ž . Ž  . Ž .u A,B,C,D 3, 3, 3, 0 , u A,B,C,D 0, 0, 0, 1 ,2 2 2  1 1 1 2  2Ž  . Ž . Ž  . Ž .uA,B,C,D 0, 0, 0, 1 ,and u A,B,C,D 0, 0, 0, 0in al other2 2 2  2 i i i i.cases
Ž .Proof. Ifg* is the graph with no links, then the CoalitionPNEg*is
the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Ž .Now let the set of players be A,B,C, letgbe the ful graph, and let
Ž.s* be a CoalitionPNEg
Ž. Ž .i If there is only one link ing*, say A,B, and there does not
Ž . Ž .exist a CoalitionPNEg* , then, in particular,s* is not a CoalitionPNEg*
Ž .  Ž  .  Ž .Then coalition A,B has a strategy s,s such thats s,s,s isA B A B Cpreferred tos* by both playersAandB, and such thatsis a Coali-
Ž .tionPNE in the game in whichs is fixed; but thens,s is a deviationC A BŽ.that contradicts the fact thats* is a CoalitionPNEg
Ž. Ž . Ž .i If there are two links ing*, say A,B and B,C, and if there
exists a deviation by one pair, we repeat the argument before to conclude
thats* cannot be a CoalitionPNE. The only other possibility is a deviation
Ž .by the three players, but then this deviation is a CoalitionPNEg*
Ž.ii Finaly, consider the case in whichgis not the ful graph: say
Ž . Ž .A,C is not permited, andg* is a graph with one link, say A,B.Ifs*is
Ž. Ž .the CoalitionPNEgand there is no CoalitionPNEg* , again, in particu-
Ž . Ž.lar, coalitionA,B has a deviation as in i that is also a deviation froms.
Q.E.D.
3. EXAMPLES
Ž .EXAMPLE 1 Dividing a dolar by majority rule  In Bernhein et al.
Ž .1987 , an example of nonexistence of CoalitionPNE is provided. In this
section, this game wil be solved by means of a natural structure.
Ž .Consider a three-player A,B,C
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game of dolar division, in which the
alocation is decided by majority. That is, al players simultaneously an-
nounce alocations; if two ormore players propose the same alocation,
then that division is implemented, whereas if al disagree, the pie is
discarded. Players wish to maximize the expected size of their shares. It is
easy to check that the game has no CoalitionPNE, which in our terminol-
Ž.ogy means that there is no CoalitionPNEgwhengis the ful graph in
Fig. 1.
Define aspirations for this graph:
1, 1, 1 e g,e g,e g 0, 0, 0 .Ž . Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž Ž .A B C
Ž .Ž .Ž .4Define the rule of order A,B,B,C,A,C . The graphgcomes
after al pairs have said yes to the formation of a link between their two
Ž .players. Consider the situation when A,C is the last pair to decide
Ž.whether to open a link or not. Player Ahas to comparee g and hisAŽaspiration in the graphg in Fig. 2. Similarly for playerB. GraphsgAC A B.andg are defined in the same way.BC Ž . Ž .It is easy to see thatA,BandCvoting 0, 1, 0 is a CoalitionPNEg ,ACŽ .and that no other alocation can be achieved in any CoalitionPNEgACTherefore, after the graphg , bothAandCwil be wiling to open aAClink between them; in other words,g leads tog.ACKnowing this, let us take one more step backward. That is, knowing that
Ž . Ž . Ž .A,C wil open a link afterg , what wil B,C do? When B,C haveACto decide after the graphg in Fig. 3, they have to keep in mind that anyCŽ . Ž . ŽCoalitionPNEg gives payofs of the form ,1 , 0 , with 0, 1 ifC Ž .  .playerCgets a positive quantity, coalition A,B wil deviate , and that
after any two links, the third one comes immediately.
Ž .The complete analysis is shown in Fig. 4. The pairs of the form i,jin
Ž .the figure mean thatichooses first between Y and N , and then playerj
chooses knowing the choice ofi. N is the continuation after one of them
said N and Y is the continuation after the two of them said Y. For this
Ž . Ž .particular example, the vectors ,0,1 and 0, ,1 are consid-
Ž .ered to be the respective payofs of a CoalitionPNEg and of a Coali-B
FIG. 1. Graphg
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FIG. 2. Graphg .AC
Ž .tionPNEg , whereg andg are defined analogously tog. The vectorA B A CŽ . Ž . Ž .a,b,cgives the payofs of a Nash equilibrium: a,b,c 0, 0, 0 and
a b c 1. The arrows in the figure show the subgame perfect equilib-
rium for the case ,1 , a, and 1 c. The other
Ž.cases could be solved similarly. In any case it is assumed that , e g;AŽ. Ž.,1 e g;1 ,1 e g The analysis predicts a naturalB Cstructure of only one link joining two players who share the dolar and
refuse to communicate with the third player.
By step 1 in the proof of Proposition 1, we can find a natural structure in
the auxiliary game by seting very low continuation values, for instance,
Ž Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž .e g,e g,e g 0,0, 0  With them we find the equilibrium de-A B C Ž .picted in the figure with payofs ,1 , 0 , so that by Proposition 1 the
Ž Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž .continuation values may be as high ase g,e g,e g ,1 ,0 .A B CSince in the coalitional structure, playerArefuses to open a link with
Ž Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž .playerC, by Proposition 2 we can sete g,e g,e g ,1 ,1 ,A B Cwhich are incompatible expectations of what to get in the nonequilibrium
situation.
The highest continuation values that we get by applying the propositions
depend on, among other things, the rule of order. In the example, if
playersBandC were the first pair to meet, we could get the result
Ž .0, ,1 for appropriate values of the parameters. Given this, the
Ž .continuation values might be as high as 1, ,1  Similarly, if players
FIG. 3. Graphg.
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FIG. 4. Dividing a dolar by majority rule. Y, Both players in the pair agree to form a link.
N, At least one player disagrees.
Ž .AandCmet first, the continuation values could be ,1,1  It might
be sensible to require that the continuation values be the same in a given
coalitional structure regardless of the rule of order. With this new require-
Ž .ment, we can set continuation values up to the levels , , , where1 2 34  4 4min ,1, , min 1 ,, 1 , and min 1, 1 ,1 .1 2 3Ž . Ž  .Thus, if 12, , , 12,12, 121 2 3
Ž .EXAMPLE 2 One seler and two buyers  Consider the folowing two
Ž .  Ž  .versions of the one seler playerA andtwo buyers playersBandC
problem. In the first version, every player announces a division of one unit
Ž .of outcome worth one dolar  If the announcement of eitherBorC
coincides with that ofA
11
, that division is implemented; otherwise, al three
players get zero. In this game, every division may be achieved in a Nash
equilibrium. If only one buyer and the seler can communicate, the
coalition-proof Nash equilibria restricted to this graph have as payofs a
division of the dolar between the buyer and the seler. If both buyers can
communicate with the seler, the seler gets everything. Whether the two
buyers can communicate between them is irrelevant. One can construct
FIGURE 5
the auxiliary linking game as in Example 1 to find the natural structure
Ž .with the same rule of order  Figure 5 shows this auxiliary game, in which
the decisions to open a link between the two buyers have been omited, as
they do not add anything to the analysis.
Ž.There are three kinds of subgame perfect equilibria: i no links are
Žopen both players in a last pair choose Y, and in the previous node they
. Ž.choose N , and a Nash equilibrium of the original game folows; i only
Žone buyer opens a link with the seler, and they share the dolar if they
are the last pair, both pairs choose N, and in the previous node they
. Ž.choose Y ; and ii both buyers open a link with the seler and the seler
Ž Ž . Ž .gets everything the pair A,C always chooses Y and the pair A,B first
.chooses Y and then N  The case studied in the example assumess1s e,1 s e, and 1 s e; other cases are solved similarly.2 1  1 2 2 3There are good interpretations for the first two equilibria, but not for the
third. The first equilibrium can be obtained if, in the case of indiference,
players make the decision to maximize the sum of payofs of the pair in the
Žlink to be formed in that decision maybe because -side payments are
.credible  The second situation is obtained if they decide not to open a link
Ž .whenever they are indiferent e.g., if to open a link is costly  To obtain
that both buyers decide to open a link with the seler, it must be the case
that, in her first decision node, playerBbehaves according to the first rule
and, in his second node, according to the second rule, which is rather hard
to interpret.
Ž .In the second game second version , the two buyers make a bid, and the
Žhighest bid gets the dolar from the seler in the tie-breaking rule, the
.
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winner is chosen at random  The only Nash equilibrium and the only
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in thisgame is that both buyers bid one
dolar, so that the seler gets al of the surplus. This being the case,
anything can be a natural structure and the outcome is just that the seler
gets one and the buyers get zero.
ŽThis example ilustrates a case of two diferent games institutions of
.trade designed to solve the same economic problem that have the same
outcomes in coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and that, nevertheless, have
completely diferent solutions within the framework of natural structures.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1.The Role of Continuation Values
In the proposed model, the object that deserves more atention is the
continuation values. Here we present several arguments in favor of their
use.
Ž.i As we pointed out in the Introduction, one can construct a
situation in which an equilibrium does not exist in subgames that clearly
wil not be folowed. This should not be the cause for the nonexistence of
the equilibrium in the whole game. An example is the game in which
player one can choose between actionsrandl. Actionrgives a payof of
x, and actionlleads to a subgame with no equilibrium. Consider the case1in which her payofs in the subgame are bounded by one. It is clear that
forx 1, one wil predict that player 1 wil choose the outside option,1even if the result of the subgame is unclear. However, according to most
equilibrium concepts, the whole game has no equilibrium.
In diferent contexts there have been diferent ways to cope with
nonexistence. In the example above, if the reason is that only pure
strategies have been considered, the introduction of mixed strategies may
be the solution. If the cause is, however, that the set of strategies is not
Ž .compact, the use of -equilibria where players maximize up to an may
restore existence. A third situation may be one in which the game is played
with communication and a coalitional equilibrium is sought, but neverthe-
less the subgame does not have such an equilibrium. Again, even ifxis1only a litle smaler than 1, player one has to be too optimistic to engage in
the subgame with no equilibrium. The introduction of continuation values
alows us to evaluate how optimistic player one could be and stil choose
the outside option, so that the whole game has an equilibrium.
Ž.i There are at least three other cases in game theory in which the
out-of-equilibrium path is not clearly defined by the equilibrium concept.
Ž .In the theory of social situations, by Greenberg 1990 , a situation is
Ž .
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regarded as part of an equilibrium if it is not dominated by another one.
In many instances this definitiondoes not answer the question of what
would actualy happen out of the equilibrium. Again, when a game is
solved using dominating strategies, the course of a subgame cannot be
defined unless it is induced by these strategies. Finaly, some set-valued
Žsolution concepts like the stable sets of equilibria in Kohlberg and
.Mertens, 1986 may not be supported by one equilibrium continuation in
every subgame, but by several continuations taken together as a set. In our
case, we make explicit why an out-of-equilibrium path is not folowed to
understand the validity of the equilibrium.
Ž.ii When an equilibrium concept fails to exist in general, an imme-
diate question is whether there exists a special set of games for which
existence can be established. In our seting, the introduction of continua-
tion values alows us to answer another interesting question: namely, what
are the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, not within the set
of games, but within every game?
Ž.iv If one understands the resulting natural structuregand a
Ž.CoalitionPNEg as an equilibrium for the game consisting of forming
coalitions endogenously, and if one thinks that, at the end of that game, an
equilibrium wil be reached and that players also expect this to happen,
then the continuation values are aspirations for an event that is not
supposed to occur. Thus, sufficiently ‘nonequilibrium averse’ aspirations
Ž .low enough continuation values are consistent with the idea of expecting
an equilibrium at the same time that they alow for the equilibrium to
exist.
The situation is similar to that in sequential equilibrium, where any
Ž .beliefs and therefore many diferent expected payofs are alowed after a
zero-probability event. In our case, we appeal to the idea that players
either do not expect too much from a situation with no equilibrium, or do
not expect a nonequilibrium at al.
Some sequential equilibria may be supported by extreme beliefs in
zero-probability events. This has caused a literature on refinements of
sequential equilibrium based on restricting the beliefs that may support an
equilibrium, thus reducing its number. In our case, Propositions 1 and 2
Žshow that imposing restrictions that play against existence continuation
.values cannot be too low and not imposing others that could play in favor
Ž .continuation values may be inconsistent are stil compatible with
existence.
Ž.v Furthermore, like beliefs in sequential equilibrium, continuation
Ž .values and aspirations in general are part of the equilibrium concept of
natural structures. This favors the folowing interpretation: ‘not too high
beliefs about payofs from structurehsupport structureg, and therefore
structuregis a possible equilibrium outcome of the game’ instead of a
diferent view that first predicts some beliefs and then a structure after
Ž .
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them. I thank a referee for this interpretation.
4.2.The Issue of Multiplicity andthe Details of the Game
The first example above showed a game with al players in a symmetric
situation and with multiple equilibria compatible with this symmetry. If no
Ž .coalitional deviations were possible, the outcome 13, 13, 13 could be
selected based on considerations of symmetry. However, when coalitions
are possible, this outcome is simply unstable. The analysis of the game
using natural structures translates the symmetry from the level of the
Ž .payofs as in Nash equilibrium to the level of the formation of winning
coalitions. Now the problem is how to choose among the three diferent
winning coalitions. The original game is silent in this respect. Either we
are satisfied with this undetermined situation, or we use the theory to find
out what kind of details that may be present in the reality can resolve it.
The present paper favors the second approach as new details appear as
important. These elements are exogenous to the original game and show a
Ž .precise way one precise rule of order and auxiliary linking game in which
players may endow themselves with a coalition structure in which the
equilibrium exists, but the same conclusions could be obtained folowing
other choices. Thus the arbitrariness of the exogenous elements in this
work is not such a great problem.
Here we are not in a worse situation than the rest of the literature.
Almost every refinement of Nash equilibrium is based onad hocassump-
tions that are not logicaly implied by the requirement of rationality. In the
literature that is closest to our work, there is often an original game to be
solved, but more structure is needed to give a hint of its resolution. For
instance, in the case of noncooperative implementation of cooperative
solutions, the non-cooperative game that provides the implementation is
totaly exogenous to the original one.
5. ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS AND
COMMUNICATION-PROOF EQUILIBRIUM
Definitions and propositions wil be rewriten to accommodate multi-
stage games. General extensive form games can also be analyzed if we
consider that the number of stages is the maximum number of nested
subgames in it; then a stage is the play between two consecutive nested
Ž .subgames see, for example, Bernhein et al. 1987  Let be a multistage
Ž .game alternatively, an extensive form game with a finite number of both
players and stages. Define a cooperation graphgand the set of coalitions
Ž. 4that are permited ing,Cg, as before. Letn,...,n be the set of1 minitial nodes of subgames in , and letg be the cooperation graphi 4associated with noden. ThenE g,...,g G wil be caled ai 1 m mcommunication structure on
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. Now we can extend the definition of
Com-PE to a communication structure.
Ž. Ž .DEFINITION1. i In a single stage game,s* is a Com-PEE if and
Ž.Ž 4only if it is a CoalitionPNEE  Note that in this case,E g, and1.Definition 1 applies.
Ž. Ž .i Inductively, let be a game oftstages. Thens* is a Com-PEE
Ž . Žif and only ifs* is a CoalitionPNEg restricted toS Coalition-1Ž . Ž.PNEg,S , whereS s S sinduces a Com-PEE in proper sub-1 4games of .
Ž . ŽCoalitionPNEg restricted toS simply means that al strategies and1. Ž.deviations must belong to the setS. The definition of Com-PEE agrees
with that of Com-PE when everyginEcontains al possible edges, andiwith the definition of SPE when every g is the graph with no links.iAspirations are defined as in the one-stage case.
Ž. Ž. Ž.4DEFINITION2. In the game ,eE e E,...,e E is an aspira-1 ntion profile in the communication structureEif
Ž. Ž. Ž.4 Ž . Ž .4 Ž.i e E,...,e E us* ,...,us* for some Com-PEEs*,1 n 1 nif it exists,
Ž. 4 Ž. Ž. Ž.i for everyi 1,...,n,e E max us if no Com-PEEi s iexists.
Ž.The componente Ewil be caled an aspiration for playeriin thei Ž.4communication structureE, ande eE wil denote a set ofE Gaspirations for al possible coalition structures.
The auxiliary linking game for an extensive form game is constructed
as before, except for the additional rule that, at the beginning of each
Žsubgame, each pair has a new opportunity to open a link folowing the
.rule of order 
DEFINITION3. LetE* be the unique communication structure associ-
ated with a SPE in pure strategies of the auxiliary linking game of when
Ž . Ž .aspirations aree*. Ife*E* are the payofs of a Com-PEE* , thenE*is
Ž .caled a natural structure of . The tripleE*,s*,e* , whereE*isa
Ž . Ž .natural structure ands* is a Com-PEE* with payofse*E* , wil be
caled an ENS of .
The counterparts of Propositions 1 and 2 can easily be stated and proved
with these new definitions, but we can stil improve the model. In Defini-
tion 3we used the concept of SPE to find a communication structure.
However, as links are open, some coalitions can be formed; therefore we
Ž. Ž .could use the notion of Com-PEE, where in each stage subgame the
corresponding graph inEis determined by the pairs with a link at that
point. Because the auxiliary linking game is of perfect information, the
Ž.existence of a Com-PEE can be obtained as a corolary of the existence
Ž .
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of Com-PE in this class of games Ferreira, 1996 
Ž .EXAMPLE 3 Dividing a dolar by majority with an outside option 
Consider the example in which player 1 chooses between an outside option
Ž .actionrthat gives himx, and a subgamegin which the game of1dividing a dolar by majority rule as described above is played by him and
Ž .players 2 and 3 actionl The game in the example has no Com-PE, since
there is no CoalitionPNE in the subgameg. However, diferent natural
structures can be found. From the analysis above, we already know the
natural structures for the subgame gthat can arise under diferent
Ž .specifications of the rule of order Fig. 4  For simplicity, the equilibrium
Ž .strategy ingwil be identified with the vote and shares of the winning
coalition, as the vote of the loser is irrelevant. The equilibria in natural
Žstructures for the complete game are as folows for simplicity we omit the
.third element, the aspirations :
C,1,2 ,r, ,1 ,0 ifx44Ž . Ž .Ž .1 1
C,1,2 ,l, ,1 ,0 ifx44Ž . Ž .Ž .1 1
C,1,3 ,r, ,0,1 ifx44Ž . Ž .Ž .2 1
C,1,3 ,l, ,0,1 ifx44Ž . Ž .Ž .2 1
C,2,3 ,r,0,,1 ifx 044Ž . Ž .Ž .3 1
C,2,3 ,l,0,,1 ifx 0.44Ž . Ž .Ž .3 1
The equilibrium in the first line is read as folows: the elementC is1Ž .either 1, 2 or the empty set, and is the communication structure in the
first stage; the second element indicates the communication structure in
Ž .the second stage subgameg; the third is player one’s action in his first
Ž .move, and the last element is the payof of a Com-PE in subgameg. The
Ž . 4other equilibria are similarly interpreted, withC 1, 3 , andC2 3Ž . 42, 3 , .
Ž .EXAMPLE 4 Divide a dolar by majority and then coordinate  This
example consists of three players playing first the game of dividing a dolar
4and, in a second stage, the coordination game, in whichS a,b,i i iŽ. Ž . Ž. Ž . Ž.us 1ifs a,a,a,us 2ifs b,b,b andus 0i 1 2 3 i 1 2 3 iotherwise. The equilibria in natural structures are of the form
1, 2 ,g , ,1 ,0 , 2,2,2 ,44Ž . Ž .Ž .Ž .C
whereg is any graph at the beginning of the coordination game with theC Ž . Ž . Ž .only condition that 1, 2 g. The vector 2,2, 2 is the payof of theC Ž .Com-PE in the coordination game. The cases in which either pair 1, 3 or
Ž .
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pair 2, 3 is formed at the beginning are similar.
Ž .EXAMPLE 5 Coordinate and then divide the dolar by majority  Fi-
naly, if the coordination game is to be played before the game of dividing
a dolar by majority, the equilibria in natural structures would be of the
form
1, 2 , 1, 2 , 2, 2, 2 , ,1 ,0 .4 4Ž .Ž . Ž .Ž .Ž .
Now, no graphs with more than one link are formed, since that would
lead to a situation of no equilibrium when the second game is to be played.
Ž .Also note that 1, 1, 1 cannot be the outcome in the first game; it certainly
Ž .may be obtained as an equilibrium with the coalitional structure 1, 2 , but
Ž .players wil form more links to deviate and get the outcome 2, 2, 2 , and
that wil result in a situation of no equilibrium in the second game. In
other words, we have the interesting result that the presence of the second
stage forces coordination among the three players, even if not al of them
are linked in a communication structure.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
General existence of stable situations when coalitions can form is almost
an impossibility, as the vote paradox, the core, and the CoalitionPNE show
in diferent contexts. In this paper we showed that there is a way in which
players can avoid this problem by endowing themselves with a cooperation
structure in which the equilibrium exists. For every rule of order, this
cooperation structure is endogenously formed.
The examples studied in the paper also ilustrate the insight that natural
structures may provide into very diferent issues, such as the relation
between the symmetry of the game and the symmetry of the equilibrium
Ž .Example 1 , the efects of natural structures on diferent mechanisms
Ž . Ž  .games designed to solve the same economic problem Example 2 , the
Ž .coordination in efficient equilibria Example 5 , and the study and inter-
Ž .pretation of social norms Example 2 
These comments open two lines for future research. One is the study of
diferent versions of the proposed model, among them the analysis of
other types of auxiliary games and the imposition of more structure on
beliefs in nonequilibrium situations. The other, and probably more inter-
Žesting, is the finding of applications in which other issues or the ones just
.mentioned are addressed.
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